




SECURITY – RISK SCENARIOS 
AND COUNTERMEASURES 
 





ABSTRACT: The Adriatic Sea is of critical 
importance for Croatian tourism and the 
economy as a whole, which is why special 
attention must be paid to its protection and 
security. The most important aspects of the 
security and protection of the Adriatic Sea 
within which concrete preventative measures 
are needed to be taken are: ecological 
protection, protection of offshore gas plants and 
installations and the safety of cruise tourism. 
Although some security measures have been 
implemented thus far, there still remains plenty 
of room for their urgent upgrading and 
alignment with real security needs. In this 
paper, we identified the most important security 
shortcomings in all the listed segments, 
presented scenarios of existing and other 
possible security threats, and provided 
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suggestions and concrete measures to raise 
the level of security of the Adriatic Sea. 
KEYWORDS: Adriatic Sea, security, tourism, 




In this paper, we will consider some of the 
possible scenarios of endangering maritime 
security. We divided the research into three 
sections. In the first section, which is also the 
main section of this paper, we will consider 
maritime incidents and their consequences in 
greater detail, with distinct emphasis on 
ecological pollution of the sea. In the second 
section we will briefly describe the current 
protection (safety/security) situation of gas 
plants and installations in the Croatian part of 
the Adriatic Sea, and we will highlight the main 
problems and proposals for raising the level of 
their security. In the third section, we will also 
briefly analyze the security of cruise ships in 
Croatia and indicate the main problems and 
proposals for raising their level of security. The 
second and third section of this paper are of 
great importance for the energy independence 
of Croatia and its economy, which require much 
more space for elaboration, meaning that we 
will publish them as separate scientific research 
in the following numbers of this scientific 
publication. Security is socially constructed, for 
different actors it has a different meaning 
(Malik, 2015), whereby the content of the 
concept of security changes in the historical 
and social context (Williams, 2008). In an 
objective sense, security measures the 



























































a subjective sense it measures the absence of 
fear that such values would be endangered 
(Wolfers, 1962). This is a “connected concept” 
(national security, economic security, social 
security, ecological security, maritime security, 
etc.) which always connects a concrete 
reference object, activity sector and a special 
way of thinking about politics (Buzan, Hansen, 
2009:10). Maritime traffic is the bloodstream of 
European prosperity. Transport of energy, 
fisheries, environment and climate change – all 
depend on and have close relations with 
maritime security in one way or another (Drent 
et al 2013:25). Security as a fundamental value 
and prerequisite for the development of society 
and economy in all its segments are not, and 
should not be projected as expenditure and a 
reactive system, but instead as a proactive 
developmental factor and the underlying 
developmental resource of the country, its 
society, economy and its citizens. 
In the area of sovereignty and sovereign rights 
of the Republic of Croatia, lie the most valuable 
and most sensitive natural systems of the 
Adriatic Sea, which are its coasts and islands. 
Comprehensive security of the Adriatic Sea is 
one of the most important national security 
priorities, which is why it represents our special 
scientific and professional interest.  
As a research tool for empirical research 
focused on studying the contemporary 
phenomenon “within its real life context, 
especially when boundaries in between 
phenomena and contexts are not obvious” (Yin, 
2007:24), case studies will be used. Case study 
“as a research strategy contains a 
comprehensive method whose components are 










































and specific data analysis approaches” (Yin, 
2007:25). In the research, we also used the 
participatory observation method, which is the 
method by which a researcher participates in 
the everyday life of people whom they are 
studying, openly or in a disguised form, 
observing when things happen, making this an 
efficient method for immediate determination of 
the situation (Tadej, 1983).. 
Maritime Accidents 
Maritime accidents in the Adriatic Sea are not 
uncommon. This is supported by the data on 
the number of interventions during three 
consecutive years, which are seen in the 
following table. 
Table 1: The number of interventions at sea by 
year 
Year 2014. 2015. 2016. 
Number of 
interventions 
342 324 447 
The accidents in the Croatian part of the 
Adriatic Sea are not related to only smaller 
boats, but to larger ones as well, of which we 
have several.  
 
Table 2: The breakdown of larger ships in the 
Adriatic Sea by year. 
Year Ship 
2008. Capadocia, Serine 
2009. Marko Polo 
2010. Orebić 




























































The question arises - why did the listed 
accidents occur? Every case, of course, needs 
to be considered separately, which goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. In principle, we 
can say how accidents can happen for a whole 
variety of reasons, from which we mention 
some: 
• Errors in sensory systems  
• Errors in interpretation of data 
• Human factor errors (inexperience, 
etc) 
• Inadequate surveillance of the 
security at sea 
Apart from the causes of the accidents, we are 
particularly interested in the consequences 
which may also be substantial. Therefore, in 
this paper we have decided to elaborate the 
scenario of a larger pollution of the sea with 
mineral oils, resulting from maritime accidents. 
We will analyze the Croatian response to a 
scenario of a 2000 cubic meters oil spill in the 
sea.  
 
Figure 1. Photographs of three larger ships 















































A. Analysis of major security and strategic 
documents related to protection of the sea 
Prior to the elaboration of the scenario itself, we 



























































security and strategic documents which are 
related to sea protection.  
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
states that the sea, the seaside and the islands 
are of particular cultural, historical, economic 
and ecological importance to the Republic of 
Croatia and have special protection.  
Marine development strategy and integral 
maritime policy of the Republic of Croatia for 
the period 2014.-2020 states that intense 
maritime transport in the pool of the Adriatic 
Sea indicates a significant risk for accidents, 
and thus potentially a powerful impact on the 
marine environment. Given the geomorphologic 
features of the Adriatic as a semi-enclosed 
marine pool, the impact of an accident may be 
detrimental to the Croatian economy, which is 
essentially focused on coastal and offshore 
activities. For this reason, the Republic of 
Croatia as a coastal state of the Adriatic Sea 
has to pay special attention, in corporation with 
other countries, to the protection of the Adriatic 
Sea in terms of its use, as well as the 
preservation.3 
The strategic plan of the Ministry of the sea, 
transport and infrastructure for the period 2017-
2019 states that the mission of the Ministry is to 
                     
3 At the global level, the most important law protecting the marine environment is the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, more precisely part XII., which is a part that, 
based on the contractual practice of the state after the Stockholm conference, 
completes the current development the protection and conservational rights of the 
marine environment and sets the foundations for its further development. Oceanic, 
marine and coastal areas are covered by Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which 
emphasizes that the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provide the appropriate legal framework for the protection and sustainable 
development of the marine and coastal environment and their natural resources. In 
achieving this goal, Agenda 21 suggests that the sea and coastal area should be 











































create conditions and build up on capacities 
that will ensure the production of quality laws 
and other regulations and their implementation 
regarding maritime security. Furthermore, in the 
same document, within the chapter Safe 
Navigation by sea, it is stated that the Ministry 
will continue to maintain and develop an 
adequate level of maritime safety and pollution 
protection in accordance with both international 
and European standards as well as the needs 
of maritime traffic participants. As one of the 
more important goals of the maritime 
developmental strategy and integral maritime 
policy of the Republic of Croatia for the period 
2014-2020, in which a number of international 
and European strategic guidelines4 have been 
taken into account, the objective 3.2.3. - reduce 
the harmful consequences of pollution from 
maritime facilities has been stated. As a way of 
achieving this goal, measure 3.2.3.2. - securing 
a special ship for large scale pollution, as well 
as renewing and modernizing a fleet of ship-
cleaners, has been taken into consideration. 
For the purpose of achieving the goal of 
reducing adverse effects caused by pollution 
                     
4 The EU strategy for the Adriatic-Ionan region, 2012: WHITE BOOK - Roadmap to a 
single European traffic space - towards a competitive and effective traffic system, 
2011; Sustainable transport system development, 2009; Strategic goals and 
recommendations for EU Maritime Traffic Policy by 2018, 2009; Communication 
and action plan of the commission with the aim of establishing the European 
Maritime Free-Standing Space without Barriers, 2009; Guidelines for integrated 
maritime policy: Best practice in integrated maritime management and stakeholder 
consultation 2008; Communication on common European port policy, 2007; 
Integrated maritime policy of the European Union, 2007; Integrated maritime policy 
of the European Union - BLUE BOOK, 2007; Integrated maritime policy of the 
European Union - ACTION PLAN, 2007; GREEN BOOK: "Towards the Future of 
Maritime Policy of the European Union:" The European Vision for the Oceans and 
the Sea, 2006; European Union transport policy, 2006; WHITE BOOK: European 
transport policy for 2020: Time of Decision, 2001; EU Maritime Security Strategy, 




























































from maritime facilities, measure 3.2.3.3. - 
ensure the availability of equipment and 
devices for the operation of pollution in the 
economic zone of the Republic of Croatia, 
territorial sea, and inland waters.5 
The SWOT analysis clearly states insufficient 
response capacities in the event of major 
pollution and other events of great magnitude 
and a high risk of pollution of the sea for 
economic development and sustainability, an 
increasing threat to human an environmental 
risks due to increased human activity on the 
sea and coast.  
B. Evaluation of existing capacity for ecological 
protection of the Adriatic Sea 
After analyzing the most important security and 
strategic documents related to protection of the 
sea, we conducted an analysis of the entire 
equipment available to companies authorized to 
implement the National Plan of Intervention of 
the Republic of Croatia and county intervention 
plans - specialized vessels for the collection of 
hydrocarbons from the surface of the sea, 
vessels, ships, air dams with inflating systems, 
pumps, skimmers, containers, vacuum kits and 
all other equipment used for ecological 
protection of the sea.  
                     
5 In the internal waters of the sea, the territorial sea and the economic zone of the 
Republic of Croatia on average, in the last 5 years (2015) each year, there have 
been 50 incidents of minor pollution of the sea, of which 25 are polluted by an 
unknown perpetrator, 14 from vessels and 11 pollutants from the land. At an 
annual level, the Ship Compliance System - ADRIREP records about 7.200 cruise 
ships (mostly tankers) which transport 75 million tonnes of hazardous and harmful 
substances as cargoes, while 11.5 million tonnes of hazardous and harmful 
substances were transshipped in Croatian ports in 2015. Although we have not 
witnessed major maritime misfortunes in the Adriatic Sea which would result in 
larger scale pollution, the number and scale of operational pollution are worrying, 










































We analyzed the equipment of 28 business 
entities and state institutions. A deeper analysis 
of the available, existing capacities and 
capabilities as well as organizational forms in 
the struggle with large amounts of pollution 
show significant shortcomings. Existing 
capacities and resources due to their core 
features and numbers cannot be used on the 
territorial sea and on larger outer islands, 
particularly in the open sea in the area of 
Protected Ecological Fishery Zone, on frequent 
tankers routes or areas of current or future 
concession fields for exploitation of oil and gas 
from the underwater world.   
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA DOES NOT 
HAVE THE CAPACITY FOR AN EFFICIENT 
BATTLE WITH SEA POLLUTION ON A 
LARGER SCALE.  
Given that the analysis carried out stems that 
Croatia has not yet reached the capacity to 
effectively counteract higher levels of 
contamination of mineral oil in the open sea, it 
has been required to seek external assistance, 
which is why we have elaborated the next 
scenario to determine what would happen in 
such situations, which results would be 
achieved and what consequences we would 
have to face. 
C. Marine pollution scenarios - pouring 2000 meters of 
medium heavy fuel 6 nautical miles south of the Ridge 
Stončica 
After the report from the resulting ecologic 
incident was received, considering it occurred 
within the area of the Split-Dalmatian County, 
the Intervention plan for sudden pollution of the 
sea in the Split-Dalmatia County was activated 



























































plan includes the organization of intervention 
and treatment in case of pollution of the sea 
and the coast exclusively in the area of the 
Split-Dalmatia county, although according to the 
National Intervention Plan (Plan of intervention 
in case of sudden pollution of the sea, NN 
92/08), the operational county in the case of 
major pollution of the sea, also takes 
operational action in the areas of Šibenik-Knin 
and Dubrovnik-Neretva county.  
The county operations center has carried out an 
analysis of the resulting situation and in 
accordance with the National Plan of 
Intervention, has informed the national 
headquarters for the implementation of the 
intervention plan. Since the conclusion that 
Croatia has no response to environmental 
pollution in the open sea has been made, 
assistance from the European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) has been requested.  
Further events will be shown throughout the 
computer presentations that we have created 
within this research, which we will place into 
concrete geographic frameworks, and where 
we will be able to track all of the elements 
which are relevant to the reaction in this and in 
similar situations over time. 
Upon the received report, EMSA alerted the 
tanker MARISA N with which they have a 
contract to provide assistance for the 
suppression of sea pollution, which according to 
the scenario described happened to Croatia. 
Tanker MARISA N was in the vicinity of Trieste 
at the time of the incident, and was not carrying 
out a commercial job at the time, which is 
otherwise authorized under the contract 
concluded with EMSA.    Due to the fact that 










































MARISA N quickly sailed out to the middle of 
the Adriatic Sea in just an hour and a half, 
which is a very optimistic scenario and quick 
reaction to the incident. Through the next few 
pictures, we will follow the movement of oil 
stains throughout time, as well as the 
movements of the tanker MARISA N in time, on 
its path from Trieste towards the position of the 
incident - the middle of the Adriatic Sea. 
Figure 2. Incident position  
 
 
Figure 3. The situation 3 hours after the report 




























































In figure 3, the red dot represents the position 
of the incident. In the upper left corner you can 
see the position of the tanker MARISA N 3 
hours following its departure from the Trieste 
port. The time of the incident is marked with 
T+3, and the black represents the ship from 
which the mineral oil was spilled. The oil stain is 
marked with the black and red colour and at this 
moment is still within the vicinity of the ship. 
The width of the stain at this point is 500 
meters. In order to better track the movement of 
oil spill in the central Adriatic Sea, in a special 
(smaller) picture we provide an enlarged 
representation of the island of Vis so that we 
can in better detail show the movement of oil 
stains and how they spread. In the larger 
image, we observe the movements of the 
MARISA N tanker from Trieste towards the 
island of Vis. By the same analogy; the 
following pictures were also highlighted. 
Figure 4. The situation 9 hours after the report 
of the ecological incident 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the tanker MARISA N 9 
hours following the report of the ecological 
incident is still quite far from the site of the 










































around 1500 meters. The oil stain moves 
towards the waters around the island of Hvar. 
Figure 5. The situation 15 hours after the report 
of the ecological incident 
 
15 hours has passed since the report of the 
incident and the width of the oil spill is 2500 
meters. The tanker MARISA N is still relatively 
far from the site of the incident (Figure 5).  
Figure 6. The situation 24 hours after the report 
of the ecologic incident 
 
After 24 hours of the report of the ecologic 
incident, tanker MARISA N (marked in green on 
the smaller image, and red on the larger image) 



























































the oil spill has already affected the island of 
Hvar and Paklinski islands (Figure 6).  
The presented situations very clearly show that 
in such a scenario, if such an event were to 
ever occur, Croatia would suffer great economic 
and environmental damage. We would like to 
point out that about 80 million tons of 
dangerous goods are transported through the 
Adriatic sea annually, and that, for a lot of 
reasons, is no longer a question of whether 
such an event will happen, but when it will 
happen.  
The main problem is that Croatia does not yet 
have the capacity to respond to such and 
similar open sea events.  
In conclusion, we state that considering the 
Adriatic Sea is a half closed sea, the countries 
which share it also share common problems. 
The Adriatic countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro and 
Slovenia) share many common problems and 
interests, and among the most threatening 
situations that these countries face are maritime 
incidents, especially pollution of the sea. The 
problem is particularly large when the pollution 
occurs near the shore, endangering the lives of 
the population, their daily activities, quality of 
life, their economy and environment including 
the plant and animal world and protected 
species. However, in spite of the common 
nature of dangers and potential catastrophes, 
these countries do not have coordinated, 
standardized or common systems and 
databases that include all information relevant 
to these issues (Bajić, 2012). It is necessary to 
integrate emergency data and procedures into 
one functional system (Stošic, 2016), which can 










































and response within national boundaries 
(Mladineo et al 2017:1-2). 
 
Security of gas installations and platforms in the Croatian 
part of the Adriatic Sea 
A. Critical infrastructure and gas fields 
The law of critical infrastructures (NN 56/13) 
incorporates the legal acquisition of the 
European Union into the legislative system of 
the Republic of Croatia. This acquisition is 
located in the Directive Council 2008/114/EC 
from December 8th, 2008. According to the 
provisions of the Directive Council and the said 
act, in the management process it is necessary 
for the owners to create a risk analysis and/or 
the administrators security plan. Energy 
security is one of the segments of national 
security and that is why we have gone into the 
analysis of the security of gas plants and 
installations in the Adriatic Sea.6 Unlike the coal 
and oil market, natural gas will play a large role 
in global markets (World Energy Assessment, 
Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability, 
United Nations Development Program, 
2000:35).  
In relation to Croatian gas self-sufficiency, we 
state that in 2016, for the first time in the last 
15-20 years, it has fallen below 50% and was 
only 44%.  The prognosis of the current trend of 
a fall in production and growth in consumption 
predicts that by 2022, production may fall to 
25%. During 2016, 24 percent less of natural 
gas was produced in the northern Adriatic fields 
                     
6 The Northern Adriatic Exploitation field is of great importance for the Republic of 



























































than the year before and for the first time in 15-
20 years the total shared consumption of 
domestic gas fell below 50%. 
Figure 7. Maritime map showing the gas fields 
in the Adriatic Sea 
 
Due to all the listed information, it is necessary 
to take into account the security of gas 
installations and platforms in the Adriatic Sea. 
Through long term monitoring of the general 
safety/security of gas installations and platforms 
in the northern part of the Adriatic Sea 
(observation with the participation of the Portus 
et Navem Ltd team of experts from 2008-2011 
and 2012-2015) the underlying risks or threats 
to their security were clearly identified. The first 
and fundamental threat is expressed by the 
positions of the fields and installations 
considering the dense maritime traffic which 
has a growing tendency. The red arrows in 
Figure 7 indicate the marked separation zone of 
navigation, and the yellow arrows indicate 
“clusters” of gas platforms which are located 
near the separation zone. Following maritime 
traffic in this area through the above mentioned 
periods and during the last 5 months of 2018 
(January-May), using the Marine traffic tool and 
electronic charts, we found that the situation 










































changed much and there have been numerous 
violations of the security zone within a 500 
meter access radius of the platforms. In general 
terms, this poses a threat to possible maritime 
incidents - collisions, damage to underwater 
pipelines and the facilities itself. Numerous 
other accidents may also occur: the impact of a 
ship hitting a platform which can cause damage 
or destruction to the gas platform, as well as 
damage to the ship, its breakdown and 
uncontrolled release of mineral oils into the sea. 
Furthermore, a scenario of a major fire outbreak 
on offshore objects or ships which are in their 
vicinity is also a possibility. The next major 
threat to the security of gas plants and 
installations are the very intense fishing 
activities within the gas fields, especially in the 
forbidden perimeter of 500 meters around the 
gas platform, which on several occasions has 
already had the effect of damaging submarine 
pipelines caused by the use of fishing gear on 
the bottom of the sea and below the surface of 
the bottom of the sea. On several occasions 
such damages have caused major bottlenecks 
in production and supply of gas and material 
costs, as well as adverse affects on marine 
flora and fauna. 














































































Many scenarios of endangering the security of 
gas plants and installations to date are not 
adequately reflected by legislators nor owners 
and operators of gas exploitation so there 
remain numerous other security risks.7 In the 
provided analysis we have noticed a lack of 
helicopter decks on the gas platforms which 
have a human crew. In the segment of threats 
of terrorist attacks, among other things, there 
was a lack of joint training of possible scenarios 
of protection and elimination of possible 
breakdowns and damage to the installations, as 
                     
7 Confirming that the security situation was exactly how we described it were 
acknowledged by the authors of this paper in October of 2017, when a team of 
experts from Portus et Navem Ltd spoke with the representatives of INAGIP and 
ED-INA on the subject of the current security situation of the gas fields in the 
Adriatic Sea and offered their consulting services for the preparation of the 
documentation required by the Law and which is set out in the Guidelines for the 
preparation delivery of the Coordination document for the safety of coastal 










































well as rapid evacuation and medical treatment 
of injured persons.8  
On July 3rd, 2015, the Croatian parliament 
proclaimed the Law on the safety of offshore 
exploration and exploitation of Hydrocarbons 
(NN 78/15). This act regulates important safety 
issues that have not yet been adequately 
considered or applied thus far. This current 
state of gas security is described at the time of 
writing this paper (May 2018), and how as well 
as how much the coastal security coordination 
will “force” operators, owners or 
concessionaires to raise the level of security of 
offshore objects remains to be seen. The 
thought is to primarily make: reports of major 
dangers, offshore object security plans, and 
other reports such as those pertaining to fires, 
explosions, diversion, sabotage, etc.  
It will be particularly interesting to analyze the 
documents related to sudden events, major 
accidents, and large dangers in the part of the 
design and implementation of major accident 
scenarios in the offshore facility security plan. 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to analyze 
how the following areas will be dealt with: plans 
and procedures in the case of terrorist threats 
or attacks on objects, spaces or contents of gas 
platforms, reacting after receiving a report of 
the  possible set up of an improvised explosive 
device; plans and procedures: supervision and 
protection of the prescribed perimeter security 
around the offshore facility, in the case of 
sudden sea pollution, in the case of evacuation 
of the offshore facility, natural disasters and 
                     
8 An attractive target for terrorist attacks would also be oil and gas platforms, because 



























































elemental disasters as well as numerous other 
security issues and procedures.  
The provisions of this act for existing offshore 
facilities will be applied from July 19th, 2018, 
meaning that we will quickly get the answers to 
the questions raised here.  
In the research we are about to publish, we will 
analyze all questions and problems we have 
outlined here and propose further concrete 
measures to raise the level of security of gas 
installations and platforms in the Adriatic Sea.  
3.  Security of cruise ships as a security challenge 
We have become witnesses of the real invasion 
of an increasing number of large cruise ships in 
our waters and ports. This is the fruit of a global 
explosion of a relatively new product of the 
tourism industry. Obviously, we have accepted 
to be a part of this growing phenomenon. The 
evidence suggests that some of our historical 
cities on the coast and islands are now under 
the siege of the cruise ships. Data indicate that 
there were 850 cruise liners with 1 000 000 
passengers in 2017. Moreover, it is announced 
that in 2018 this number could increase by 
30%. Although such traffic brings the financial 
benefit to our total tourist product, in this paper 
we will address simultaneous threats to overall 
maritime security. The increase of cruise ships 
number in our waters, and especially the ports 
of historical cities, leads to growing risks of 
possible incidents with serious and uncertain 
consequences. It is therefore necessary to be 
aware of the potential challenges and issues 











































The aim of this paper is to perform risk analysis 
based on realistic scenarios of threats. It is our 
wish to point out procedures that can improve 
the overall maritime security, the protection of 
our seas and historical cities on the coast and 
the islands from the great negative 
consequences of the possible maritime 
incidents and disasters that involve cruise 
ships. 
A. Risks, threats and scenarios of general maritime 
security 
Risk is the result of threats with negative 
consequences on a vulnerable system 
(Haimes, 2006:293). Cruise ships and 
passenger ferries are particularly vulnerable, 
due to the fact that a large number of people 
are restricted to one physical space (Warouw, 
2005). In addition, they navigate to pre set and 
publicly available rows of navigation, which is 
why they are susceptible to interception after 
their departure.  
In order to understand the reality of threats 
which target cruise ships or come from them, it 
is first necessary to look at what can actually 
happen to that technological giant?  
For this purpose it is necessary to generate 
realistic scenarios of possible incidents. Here 
are some of the possible scenarios: 
(1) Major fire outbreak on a ship at the 
open sea, approaching the port or in 
the port itself 



























































(3) An explosion on the ship as a result 
of a technological error or a 
terroristic act  
(4)  Massive unknown illness 
(virus) among passengers of the 
ship  
(5) Ship abduction - hostage takeover 
 
Once we have realized what the realistic 
scenarios and threats may be, a whole range of 
questions are opened that need to be 
answered. Further, we list the problems which 
are placed in front of the country of the relative 
port in the city within which the cruise ship 
enters or resides. 
Figure 10. Overcrowding the port and the city of 













































B. Basic organizational and procedural challenges  
It should be noted that mass rescue operations 
everywhere in the world require prepared 
answers and continuous training, which for us, 
is unfortunately not the case.  
Furthermore, the following questions are 
opened:  
(1) Who is the carrier of the crisis 
resolution operation? 
(2) What is the chain of command like? 
(3) How is the control panel structured?  
(4) Who contains the equipment and 
personnel to solve the crisis?  
(5) What are the capabilities and 
capacities available to deal with 
crisis situations? 
(6) What is the reaction time to the 




























































(7) What is the degree of training and 
experience of crisis rescue 
participants? 
It is difficult to find the answer to a large number 
of questions and we conclude that a whole 
series of factors are missing in order to 
effectively counteract the crisis situation.  
With analysis through the operational work in 
the port security sector in the Republic of 
Croatia, through discussions with authorities in 
the area of crisis resolution and analysis of 
positive laws and by-laws, we have determined 
how to continue further. 
C. Own limitations and disadvantages  
Bearing in mind all the spatial, navigational and 
hydro meteorological complexities of our 
opportunities, we have identified the following 
main drawbacks:  
(1) Problems of legislative nature  
(2) Inadequate procedures and 
insufficient plans  
(3) Limited resources (evacuation and 
rescue) 
(4) Lack of capacity (ship and 
equipment) for offshore action at the 
national level 
(5) Unsatisfactory degree of readiness 
for crisis management (reaction 
time) 
(6) Restrictive and insufficient 
infrastructure and capacities of 
historic cities  
(7) The lack of an infrastructure which 










































and medical care of a large number 
of people in a short period of time 
D. Recommendations for improving the current situation  
Following all of the above, we have made 
recommendations for raising the level of the 
tourist segment of cruise tourism as follows:  
(1) Systematically build a complete 
integrated incident management 
system  
(2) Arrange existing plans and 
procedures in ports open to 
international traffic 
(3) Along with the constant obligation of 
pilotage, provide mandatory 
assistance of the necessary number 
of tugs in Croatian ports 
(4) Establish a continuous duty (24/7) 
and readiness (stand-by) fire-
fighting ships - tugboats for 
maneuvering and setting up dams to 
prevent pollution of the sea  
(5) Ensure constant availability of 
equipment and teams for the 
reception and disposal of large 
numbers of people (athletic halls, or 
other suitable public facilities) 
 
As a conclusion of everything in the segment of 
cruise control, we must point out that cruise 
tourism is both a chance as well as a challenge. 
Therefore, this is a new phenomenon which 
searches for a new approach, new scientific 
and professional research showing that 
integrated managing of gains and risks is the 




























































It is undisputed that the Adriatic Sea is 
extremely important for Croatian tourism and 
the economy as a whole, however, its safety is 
not at a satisfactory level. In the first section of 
this paper, we clearly indicated how Croatia 
does not have an adequate response to greater 
amounts of environmental pollution on the open 
sea and that Croatia would suffer major 
economic and environmental damage if the 
described events occurred today. We further 
elaborated that protecting important critical 
offshore infrastructures must be at a much 
greater level than it is today. In the many 
scenarios described in the second section of 
this paper, gas plants and installations could 
suffer major damage, and natural gas 
production in Croatia could sink into a major 
crisis. The industry of cruise tourism, described 
in the third section of the paper, represents a 
major security challenge for Croatia which does 
not at this point in time have precise answers to 
numerous security issues in this segment. 
Urgent and numerous improvements are 
required in all of these segments in order to 
achieve optimal security levels. We will 
continue with this research in all the segments 
described throughout this paper and continue to 
present the results of our research, as well as 
propose specific measures for raising the 
overall security of the Adriatic Sea. 
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